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The high oil prices and the sharp increases in royalties mean that the natural 
gas boom in Bolivia has become very important for the economy, and 
particularly important as a source of government revenues. Using a CGE 
model, Andersen et al (2006) show that the natural gas boom is likely to 
boost GDP growth by about 1 percentage point per year. However, if the 
government continues with past spending and investment patterns, the boom 
is also likely to have a very adverse effect on the income distribution, so 
much so that the poorest half of the population is likely to experience 
absolute reductions in their real income levels compared to a scenario 
without gas boom. The present paper explores alternative uses of natural gas 
revenues in the CGE model to see if a better outcome can be engineered. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A recent paper by Andersen et al (2006) used a CGE model of the Bolivian economy to 
simulate some of the changes that were likely to occur in the Bolivian economy due to the 
increased natural gas exports, focusing particularly on the changes in income distribution 
that were likely to arise from these economic changes. The simulations showed that the 
natural gas boom looks very good from the viewpoint of the government: GDP growth rates 
are consistently higher than in the NO GAS scenario and the government has substantially 
more resources available for spending and investment, implying a smaller budget deficit, 
less indebtedness, more public investment and better paid teachers and doctors. However, if 
the government spends and invests all the additional revenues following the same pattern as 
in the base year (1997), then the natural gas boom is likely to have a very adverse effect on 
the income distribution. So much so that the two biggest and poorest groups (rural small 
holders and urban informals) actually see absolute reductions in their real incomes 
compared to the NO GAS scenario.  
 
The predicted deterioration of the income distribution and the consequent increase in 
poverty is a result of the structure of the Bolivian economy. Particularly important is the 
existence of two poor, informal sectors which are largely excluded from participating in the 
boom, as their informal status implies that they cannot provide goods and services for the 
sectors that prosper under the natural gas boom (mainly the public sector and the 
construction sector and to a lesser extent various service sectors). Equally important is the 
lack of mobility between the two informal sectors and the remaining formal sectors, a 
situation which explains the very large and persistent gap between rich and poor in Bolivia. 
 
One might expect some positive trickle down effects towards the poor, informal sectors if 
formal sector employees, who benefit substantially from the natural gas boom, start buying 
more informal goods and services. However, it is equally likely that the richer public sector 
employees switch towards buying more formal goods and services (they need to present   3
more facturas due to their higher incomes) and less informal goods, in which case the 
informal sectors would be further separated from the formal economy. 
   
There are at least two options that might prevent such a negative outcome of the natural gas 
boom. One possibility is if the government does not spend and invest all the natural gas 
revenues, but instead redistributes it directly to the population, so that everybody is assured 
a share of the revenues. The second possibility is to help informal sector workers move into 
the formal sectors which prosper in the natural gas economy.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the feasibility, advantages, and drawbacks of these 
two options.   
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the structure 
of the CGE model and the main assumptions used in the different scenarios. Section 3 
shows the predicted effects of the natural gas exports to Brazil and Argentina if the 
government continues past patterns of spending, investment and transfers. Section 4 shows 
the results of a simulation in which the government redistributes a large part of the natural 
gas revenues directly to the population instead of spending it. Section 5 analyzes the 





This section briefly explains the main assumptions underlying the three different scenarios 




The Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model used in this paper as well as in 
Andersen et al (2006) and Andersen & Faris (2002) is a standard 12-sector recursively   4
dynamic model. It is based on the 1997 disaggregated Social Accounting Matrix for Bolivia 
described in Thiele & Piazolo (2002). 
 
There is one capital category and five types of labor: skilled, unskilled agricultural, 
unskilled non-agricultural, smallholder, and urban informal. Amongst the labor classes, 
labor is mobile only between the two unskilled classes and between the smallholders and 
the informal sector. There are six household categories defined by the source of their 
income.  
 
Public investment is assumed to increase the stock of public goods (infrastructure, property 
rights, etc.), which increases the productivity of all productive sectors. This is an admittedly 
optimistic assumption in a country which is usually found to be among the most corrupt in 
the world (www.transparency.org).   
 




This paper will compare three different scenarios. The base scenario (NO GAS) is a 
counterfactual simulation which maintains oil and gas production at the low levels observed 
in 1998. Then there are two GAS scenarios which differ only in the way the government 
uses its hydrocarbon revenues. The GAS – NORMAL SPENDING scenario assumes that 
the government maintains the pattern of spending, investment and transfers that was 
observed in the base year, just on a larger scale. In contrast, the GAS – TRANSFERS 
scenario assumes that the government transfers a large share of revenues (45%) directly to 
the population.  
 
Both GAS scenarios assume a vastly increased natural gas production which is necessary to 
fulfill the long run contracts signed with Brazil and Argentina (see Figure 1). The figures 
for “GAS” during the period 1998 to 2005 correspond to actually observed production   5
volumes. The rest is a conservative projection based on the natural gas export volumes 
stipulated in long run contracts with Brazil and Argentina. 
 






































































































































Due to the unpredictability of future oil prices, Andersen et al (2006) uses two different 
prices scenarios. In both scenarios, oil and gas prices follow the actual development of 
prices between 1998 and 2005. The “High price” scenario assumes that prices keep 
increasing reaching a level corresponding to about $70/barrel in 2019 (6 times higher than 
the level observed in 1998), whereas the “Low price” scenario assumes that prices will 
soon start falling, reaching a level around $20/barrel in 2019 (see Figure 2). In this paper 
we will use only the “High price scenario”. 
   6



























































































Source: Andersen et al (2006). 
 
Finally, it is assumed that royalties and taxes follow actual numbers between 1998 and 
2005, increase to 50% of gross revenues at wellhead in 2006 and stays at that level for the 
rest of the simulation period.  
 
3. Simulation results with normal government spending  
 
The simulation results show substantial positive effects from the natural gas boom on GDP 
growth. In the GAS – NORMAL SPENDING scenario the model predicts additional GDP 
growth of 1-2 percentage points for most years in the projection period (see Figure 3). This 
is due to the continuous expansion of natural gas production, plus the substantial 
investments in public goods, which are assumed to make everybody more productive.  
 
   7
Figure 3: Increase in GDP growth rates due to natural gas exports  













































































































The increase in GDP is not evenly distributed across sectors, however. While production in 
the oil and gas sector increases tremendously, production in the mining sector would drop 
by some 20 percent due to the appreciation of the real exchange rate caused by the natural 
gas boom. Output from modern agriculture is also predicted to fall initially (for the same 
reason), but it is expected to recover later due to the increase in productivity caused by the 
large public investments in public goods. 
 
All other sectors are predicted to benefit from the natural gas boom, especially Utilities, 
Construction and Capital Goods, which all benefit from the large increase in public 
investments (see Figure 4). 
   8
Figure 4: Changes in sectoral production due to natural gas exports  
















































































































Figure 5 shows that real incomes increase correspondingly for most types of households. 
Apart from the government itself, the big winners of the gas boom are Employers, 
especially those in Construction and Utilities. They share some of the benefits of the 
increased activity with their Employees (skilled) and Workers (unskilled).  
 
There are two large groups who are almost completely by-passed by the boom, and who 
actually see falls in their real incomes during most of the projection period. These are the 
two initially poorest types of households: rural Small-Holders (40% of all households) and 
Urban Informals (25% of all households). 
 
   9
Figure 5: Changes in real incomes due to natural gas exports  




































































































The fact that the initially richest groups benefit greatly from the natural gas boom while the 
initially poorest loose out, implies that both inequality and poverty increases due to the 
natural gas boom, at least if the government doesn’t change the way it spends, invests and 
redistributes its revenues. 
 
  
4. Direct transfers instead of government spending 
 
If the substantial public revenues arising from natural gas exports (about $700 million per 
year at the moment) were distributed directly to the whole population instead of going 
trough the public sector machinery which tends to benefit mainly skilled workers (teachers,   10
medical workers, bureaucrats, secretaries, etc.) and construction workers, we would expect 
a much better outcome in terms of the income distribution.  
 
In order to investigate the consequences of such a scheme of unconditional transfers we run 
the same simulations as above, but with the change that 45% of hydrocarbon revenues are 
distributed directly to the whole adult population in equal amounts. The remaining 55% are 
used for normal government spending and investment. The extreme case of 100% of 
hydrocarbon revenues being distributed directly to the people could not be simulated as the 
CGE model could find no solution; 45% was the highest share the model could handle. 
 
Figure 6 shows that GDP growth rates would be much smaller in the TRANSFER scenario 
than in the NORMAL SPENDING scenario. Indeed, the additional GDP growth due to the 
gas boom would be close to zero. The reason for this is mainly the much lower level of 
government investment in public goods. With less public goods (such as roads), all private 
producers are assumed to be less productive. 
 














































































































































GAS - REDISTRIBUTION GAS - NORMAL SPENDING
 
   11
The sharp increase in production from the hydrocarbon sector is compensated by the drop 
in production in other export sectors, due to the Dutch Disease phenomenon (see Figure 7). 
By comparing Figure 4 and Figure 7, we see that sectoral production is lower in almost all 
sectors in the TRANSFER scenario compared to the NORMAL SPENDING scenario. The 
exceptions are Coca and Formal Services, which do slightly better in the TRANSFER 
scenario.  
 
Figure 7: Changes in sectoral production due to natural gas exports,  










































































































Real incomes received by the poorest households increase dramatically in the TRANSFER 
scenario, which is in sharp contrast to the results of the NORMAL SPENDING scenario in 
which the poorest households see absolute reductions in real incomes. In the TRANSFER 
scenario, rural Small-Holders improve their incomes by more than 50% compared to the 
NO GAS scenario, and Urban Informals see an increase of almost 25% (see Figure 8). 
Skilled Employees do almost as well as they do in the NORMAL SPENDING scenario, 
whereas Unskilled Workers are substantially worse off. The transfers they would receive   12
from the government are not enough to compensate them for the lower incomes due to less 
activity in Mining, Construction and Modern Agriculture. 
 













































































Since the initially poorest (and largest) groups improve their incomes most, both inequality 
and poverty would fall in this scenario. Thus, although the natural gas boom would hardly 
have an effect on GDP growth rates, it would have a significantly beneficial effect on 
poverty and inequality. At least while the boom lasts. 
 
5. Improved mobility between labor groups 
 
The other option for improving the distributional outcomes of the natural gas boom in 
Bolivia is to facilitate the movement of workers from the two large informal sectors (rural 
small-holders and urban informals) to the remaining formal sectors which all prosper in the 
natural gas economy (with normal government spending).    13
 
Especially the construction sector should be able to absorb quite a lot of additional 
unskilled workers. Figure 4 shows that the construction sector increases by about 40% 
compared to the NO GAS scenario, which implies that it might be able to hire up to 80.000 
additional construction workers, if it does not raise the salary levels. 
 
The public sector might also use its additional incomes to hire more public sector 
employees instead of paying higher salaries to existing staff. With the 40% higher real 
incomes suggested by the model (see Figure 5 above), the public sector could hire close to 
100.000 additional employees. Since the public sector hires mostly skilled workers (more 
than 75% of public sector employees have a high school degree), the public sector probably 
wouldn’t be able to absorb more than 25.000 people from the informal sectors, however. 
 
Informal services (mainly domestic help) increase by 20-40% (see Figure 8), which implies 
that this sector might be able to absorb another 50.000 unskilled workers, mainly women. 
 
In total, if the booming sectors used all their additional income to hire additional workers 
instead of increasing salaries for existing workers, these sectors might conceivably absorb 
up to 25% of existing rural small-holders and urban informals. This would happen 
gradually over the next decade or so, if the natural gas boom with high oil-prices continues 
that long.  
 
In this scenario, most of the gains from the natural gas boom would go to those who 
manage to switch from a low-income sector to a higher-income sector. Those who were 
already in a higher-income sector would not benefit much, as the higher incomes for the 
whole group would be shared among more group members.  
 
The mechanisms through which mobility could be improved are different for rural small-
holders and urban informals. Rural small-holders would generally have to move physically 
from dispersed rural areas to urban or semi-urban areas, where formal jobs for unskilled 
workers can be found. This is often difficult, as rural small-holders are frequently tied to   14
their land, as the lack of formal private property rights often means that they cannot sell 
their lands at a fair price. Even when they can, the proceeds are often too low to pay for the 
start up costs it would require to start a new life in the city (see Andersen & Nina, 2006). In 
addition, the language and cultural barriers may be daunting, especially for the older 
generations. 
 
The government and the aid community can make rural-urban migration less costly by 
providing adequate urban infrastructure (city planning, roads, sanitation, electricity, 
schools, health clinics, etc) in the main receiving cities (mainly the outskirts of Santa Cruz 
de la Sierra, El Alto, and Cochabamba) in a timely manner. Another service that would help 
is to provide a simple, speedy and fee free process of obtaining property rights, which 
would make it easier to sell and buy properties and thus to move to where opportunities are 
best. Initiatives aimed at keeping the rural population in place are obviously counter-
productive in this respect. 
 
The change from being self-employed and free to decide what to do and when to do it to 
becoming a worker with rigid work hours and little control is perhaps the biggest deterrent. 
Entrepreneurs in El Alto report that one of their biggest obstacles to growth is the 
unreliability of the labor force, as workers are often late or do not show up at all
1. 
 
The limits to mobility between the urban informal sector and the urban formal sector are 
completely different. Large parts of the urban informal sector are very dynamic and clearly 
have potential to grow into formal enterprises if the obstacles to turn formal were removed. 
The main obstacles to this are related to bureaucracy, taxes and labor laws, so they are not 
impossible to remove. Basically, a small informal family business is blessedly free of 
bureaucracy and pay little if any taxes. But if they should wish to turn into a formal 
business employing workers and paying regular salaries, they are met with a mountain of 
bureaucracy, labor laws which make it very expensive to get rid of un-necessary workers, 
and steep increases in taxes.   
                                                 
1 Results from workshops conducted with entrepreneurs in El Alto by Grupo Integral in the fall of 2006.   15
 
To make the transition smoother, and thus create more formal sector jobs, it is necessary to 
make labor laws more flexible. This means less job-security for those who already have 
formal sector jobs, but better opportunities for the poor to get a job and thus escape poverty. 
 
It is also necessary to smooth the dramatic jump in taxes, which can be done either by 
raising taxes on informal businesses or reducing them for the formal businesses, or both. If 
it was made much simpler to register a formal business, the government could simply 
require all businesses to become formal, and not tolerate informal, non-contributing 
businesses. They could also create incentives, such as subsidized credit from sectoral 




This paper has simulated the effects of the natural gas exports to Brazil and Argentina in a 
Computable General Equilibrium model, and the simulation results show that the economic 
outcomes depend completely on how the revenues are spent. If the government keeps 
spending, investing and redistributing as they did in the late 1990s, the natural gas boom 
will cause significant additional GDP growth (1-2% extra per year), but the benefits will be 
so unevenly distributed that inequality and poverty increases. This is because the two 
largest and poorest segments of the population (rural small-holders and urban informals) 
are largely bypassed by the benefits of the boom, but suffer higher costs-of-living together 
with everybody else. 
 
In contrast, if a substantial share of natural gas revenues is redistributed directly to the 
whole adult population, poverty and inequality will decrease, but there will be little 
additional GDP growth, as the government will not have as many funds available for 
investment in public productivity enhancing goods. 
   16
Considering the possibility that the public sector may not be able to invest the hydrocarbon 
revenues 100% efficiently in public goods that increase the productivity of everyone, it is 
likely that the difference in GDP growth between the two scenarios is not as large as the 
simulations suggest. When taking this quite likely possibility into account, the scenario 
with redistribution becomes relatively more favorable. Another factor that works in this 
direction is the possibility that the savings and investment rate of the poor is higher for the 
government transfers than for their earned income, which barely covers the basics, and thus 
has savings rates close to zero. The CGE model assumes that the savings rate is constant, 
which may be unrealistic. 
 
Since the simulations assumed a consistently high oil price, there is little volatility in 
natural gas revenues in the model simulations. In reality, oil prices are very volatile, and 
thus not good to rely on for basic public expenditures, such as salaries to teachers, health 
workers, and armed forces.  
 
An interesting combination of uses may be to allocate a fixed amount of revenues every 
year to ordinary government spending (education, health, police, etc) and distribute the 
excess revenues directly to the population. This would provide a stable, predictable income 
for the government, which is good as the needs for government expenditures are quite 
stable and predictable. It would also provide unpredictable incomes for the households, 
which is good, since unexpected incomes usually are associated with a higher propensity to 
save than steady and predictable incomes (see, for example, Adams 2002). If hydrocarbon 
transfers to the households were too regular, they might be substituted for other types of 
income which would require hard work, which means that labor supply would be reduced 
and GDP would fall.  
 
Since the natural gas boom some day will end, it is important to avoid that households 
become too dependent on the transfers. Experiences from other transfer programs 
(specifically the BONOSOL program in Bolivia) show that a large unexpected payment 
(such as the first BONOSOL payment) have a much more beneficial effect on household   17
investment than smaller, but regular, transfers which tend to turn into consumption (see 
Martinez 2006). 
 
It is also important that the government does not become dependent on hydrocarbon 
revenues, so it should make serious efforts to increase its tax base, which means stimulating 
the formalization of the economy as well as facilitating rural-urban migration. 
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